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BRIEF FOR
PROFESSOR WALTER DELLINGER
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
This brief is submitted on behalf of Professor
Walter Dellinger.1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Walter Dellinger is the Douglas B. Maggs Professor Emeritus of Law at Duke University.2 Professor
Dellinger has studied the scope of the Article III
jurisdiction of federal courts, including issues relating
to Article III standing. He likewise has studied the
scope of judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. Based on
his study of the applicable precedent and principles,
he believes that none of the respondent States has
standing to challenge the November 20, 2014 memorandum on immigration enforcement issued by the

1

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.
No person other than amicus curiae or his counsel made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of
this brief. Although Professor Dellinger is also a partner at
O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, which is pro bono co-counsel for
intervenors-respondents Jane Does, Professor Dellinger did not
participate in the drafting of that brief.
2
The institutional affiliation is listed for identification
purposes only.
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Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(Guidance), and that the APA does not provide them a
cause of action.
Professor Dellinger filed an amicus brief in
support of respondents on the issue of standing in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

3
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court draws much of its legitimacy from
deciding not to decide. The Court “is vested with the
‘Power’ to resolve not questions and issues but ‘Cases’
or ‘Controversies.’ ” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org.
v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011). “Continued adherence to the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
III maintains the public’s confidence in an unelected
but restrained Federal Judiciary.” Id. at 133. For
“[i]f a dispute is not a proper case or controversy,” its
resolution is committed to the political and legislative
process, and “the courts have no business deciding it,
or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341
(2006).
These principles are at their most salient here,
where “[t]he public is currently engaged in an active
political debate over” this subject matter. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. Indeed, this case has all
the trappings of an epic political battle. More than
half the States are arrayed against the federal government. Many other States take the opposite view
and argue they are affirmatively harmed by the
injunction imposed at the behest of the first group of
States. At issue is immigration, one of the most
divisive, ideologically charged questions of our day.
And the case arrives at this Court in the midst of a
presidential election campaign in which the very
policy challenged here is a central issue of contention.

4
Given the political electricity pulsing through
this case, the Court must take extra care to determine whether it is a “Case[ ]” that can be decided by
the federal judiciary, and, even if so, whether any
cause of action provides a basis for review. Application of long-settled principles yields but one answer to
those questions: no. The purported injuries respondents assert are both self-imposed and non-concrete,
and the policy they challenge is a quintessential case
of enforcement discretion. The dispute accordingly
presents only “questions and issues” (Winn, 563 U.S.
at 132) that must be left to the political process.
To hold otherwise would not only inject the Court
into this political maelstrom, but also the next one,
and the next. For the theory of standing advanced
by respondents here would not be good for this case
only. If adopted, it would open wide a back door to
federal court for States seeking resolution of a host of
politically charged disputes where the front door to
individual plaintiffs has been barred by this Court’s
precedents. Respondents’ novel theory of APA review
would likewise place the courts in a supervisory
status over a wide range of discretionary executive
decisions, without any meaningful standards for
evaluating them.
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.

5
ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT STATES LACK ARTICLE
III STANDING

Article III of the Constitution gives federal courts
the power to resolve only “Cases” and “Controversies.”
That limited power allows a federal court to settle
disputes only if the party before it “seek[s] a remedy
for a personal and tangible harm.” Hollingsworth,
133 S. Ct. at 2661. “Vindicating the public interest
(including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
To have the personal stake required by Article
III, a party must show, at a minimum, that (1) it has
suffered an “injury in fact—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical”; (2) there is “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant”; and (3) it is “likely” that “the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.
at 560 (quotation marks, alterations, and citations
omitted).
Respondents cannot make that showing here
because their alleged injuries are not fairly traceable
to the Guidance and are neither concrete nor particularized. Allowing the Fifth Circuit’s contrary conclusion to stand would open federal courts to a flood of

6
political litigation that this Court’s standing precedent has until now barred.
A. Respondents Fail To Show That Any Injury Is Fairly Traceable To The Guidance
Respondents do not have standing to sue the
United States because they cannot show an injury
that is fairly traceable to the challenged Guidance.
Any injury they suffer—if indeed there is one, cf.
infra Section I.B—is instead the result of their own
voluntary choices. Such self-imposed “injury” has
never provided a ticket to federal court.
1. When “the plaintiff is [itself] an object of the
action (or forgone action)” it wishes to challenge,
“there is ordinarily little question that the action or
inaction has caused [it] injury, and that a judgment
preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62. But when
“a plaintiff ’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.”
Id. at 562. The “standing” of the non-regulated
plaintiff “is ordinarily substantially more difficult to
establish.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted). When
the plaintiff seeks to challenge a decision not to
prosecute someone else, the obstacle to standing is
insurmountable. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 619 (1973). And, as particularly relevant here, a
plaintiff lacks any “judicially cognizable interest in
procuring enforcement of the immigration laws”
against another. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S.
883, 897 (1984).
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Respondents, who are not the object of the Guidance or at all regulated by it, fall well short of surmounting these obstacles. The “subsidized driver’s
license” injury to Texas on which the Fifth Circuit relied is self-imposed and therefore not fairly traceable
to the federal action respondents seek to challenge.
Texas’s theory of standing goes like this. Under
Texas law, non-citizens may apply for a driver’s
license if they present “documentation issued by the
appropriate United States agency that authorizes the
applicant to be in the United States.” Tex. Transp.
Code § 521.142(a). Texas has chosen to construe this
statute to cover “documentation” that an alien receives
when granted “deferred action.” Tex. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, Verifying Lawful Presence 4 (July 2013). Texas
charges $24 to issue a driver’s license, Tex. Transp.
Code § 521.421(a-3), an amount Texas contends is
below its actual cost, Pet. App. 20a-21a. Texas posits
that because of the Guidance more Texas residents
would be eligible for driver’s licenses and thus apply
to receive them. And because Texas subsidizes each
license it issues, Texas will spend more money as a
result of the Guidance. That supposed pocket-book
injury, the argument goes, gives Texas standing to
challenge the Guidance.3
3

Although here the State decided to tie its subsidy to
federal documentation before the federal government expanded
the policy that the State wishes to challenge, there is nothing in
the logic of respondents’ standing theory that requires that
sequence. The same theory of standing would seemingly hold
(Continued on following page)
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That chain of causation is broken at its very first
link—Texas’s voluntary choice to confer a state subsidy (for a driver’s license) based on a federal policy (of
granting deferred action and accompanying documentation to an alien). When Texas made that choice, it
understood that the federal government historically
had granted deferred action to different categories of
aliens over time and presumably would continue to do
so. Yet the State still voluntarily chose to tie its
subsidy to another sovereign’s choices. And after the
scope of the federal policy did in fact expand, Texas
has voluntarily adhered to its decision to confer a
state subsidy based on federal documentation. Those
voluntary choices by Texas, rather than any federal
action, are the legally cognizable cause of any increased state expenditures on driver’s licenses.
Texas and other States that have made that
choice are thus just like Pennsylvania in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam).
There, the Pennsylvania legislature had voluntarily
provided a Pennsylvania tax credit for taxes Pennsylvania residents paid to New Jersey. Id. at 663.
Pennsylvania then attempted to sue New Jersey,
claiming that New Jersey’s tax on Pennsylvania
residents was unlawful. Pennsylvania asserted it
was injured because the challenged New Jersey tax

even if Texas had adopted its current driver’s-licensing scheme
after issuance of the Guidance. In both instances, any “injury”
from a change to federal practice would be self-imposed.
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resulted in decreased revenue for Pennsylvania due
to increased Pennsylvania tax credits.
This Court held that Pennsylvania had no standing to sue because any injury related to New Jersey’s
tax was “self-inflicted.” Id. at 664. The Court observed that “nothing prevents Pennsylvania from
withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New Jersey.” Ibid. Any harm to the Pennsylvania fisc was
therefore not fairly traceable to New Jersey but
instead to its own decision not to withdraw the tax
credit. “No State can be heard to complain about
damage inflicted by its own hand.” Ibid.4
So too here. Texas was not required to offer a
subsidy to driver’s-license applicants based on federal
documentation of deferred-action status. Having
voluntarily ceded to another sovereign the effective
decision regarding which parties merit such a subsidy,
Texas has no right to complain in federal court that it
is now unhappy with that other sovereign’s choice.5
4

Although the Court in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey framed
the issue as one of causation, one could equally view a selfimposed “injury” as no cognizable injury at all. Either way, a
self-imposed injury would not satisfy Article III’s case-orcontroversy requirement.
5
Respondents attempt to avoid the “self-inflicted injury”
problem with their theory of standing by relying on Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), Br. in Opp. 15-16, but that effort
fails. That case did not involve a sovereign’s attempt to challenge
another sovereign’s law on which the first sovereign had voluntarily based eligibility for a benefit. The situation was just the
opposite: the challenged Oklahoma statute explicitly targeted
(Continued on following page)
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2. Respondents’ theory of standing would not
only provide a basis for States to challenge myriad
federal immigration decisions, see Pet. Br. 31, but it
would also provide a ready work-around in many
other cases where courts have found that individual
plaintiffs lacked standing. By following the path laid
out by respondents here, States could effectively step
into those individual plaintiffs’ shoes and litigate
policy disputes with the federal government. That
would turn standing doctrine on its head. This Court
has long recognized that “[a] State does not have
standing as parens patriae to bring an action against
the Federal Government.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982)
(citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86
(1923), and Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241
(1901)). A State therefore has no standing to raise
individual plaintiffs’ claims even when the individuals would have standing. If no individual would have
standing, it should therefore follow a fortiori that a
State would not either.
The Texas work-around could be applied, for
example, to evade the courts’ consistent holdings that
plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge others’
tax exemptions. For example, in Allen v. Wright, 468
Wyoming for discrimination and Wyoming filed suit to defend
itself. See Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 443. There is a reason why the
later-decided Wyoming v. Oklahoma did not cite Pennsylvania v.
New Jersey: the standing inquiries in the two cases are wholly
unrelated.
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U.S. 737 (1984), “[p]arents of black public school
children allege[d]” that the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) “ha[d] not adopted sufficient standards and
procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools.” Id.
at 739. They sought, among other things, “an injunction requiring the IRS to deny tax exemptions to a
considerably broader class of private schools” than
was the case under then-policy. Id. at 747. This
Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because the
“line of causation between” the “IRS’s grant of tax
exemptions to some racially discriminatory schools”
and “desegregation of [plaintiffs’ children’s] schools
[was] attenuated at best.” Id. at 757.
Likewise, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), this Court held that
“[s]everal indigents and organizations composed of
indigents” lacked standing to challenge an IRS revenue ruling that confirmed a hospital’s Section
501(c)(3) “charitable” status even though (the plaintiffs alleged) the hospital provided inadequate care to
indigents. Id. at 28, 37-45. In particular, the Court
held that it was “speculative” whether the revenue
ruling would result in an increased denial of service
to indigents. Id. at 42.
And in In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit held that
abortion-rights groups lacked standing to challenge
the tax-exempt status of the Roman Catholic
Church based on its alleged political activities. Id. at
1022, 1031. Among other things, the court held that
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plaintiffs lacked “taxpayer standing” to challenge the
IRS’s alleged failure to properly enforce rules governing 501(c)(3) organizations. Id. at 1028; see also Am.
Soc’y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d
145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no standing to challenge
tax-exempt status of American Jewish Congress).
Under respondents’ theory of standing in this
case, however, States would have standing to assert
all of these claims. Many States choose to grant tax
exemptions from their own state taxes to organizations that are tax exempt under federal law. E.g.,
Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations § 3.4 (11th ed. 2015); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code
§§ 23701-23712; Tex. Tax Code §§ 151.310(2), 171.063(a).
That voluntary choice means that a State loses tax
revenue when the IRS grants (or maintains) an
entity’s tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a),
(c)(3). If Texas has standing in this case, then that
revenue impact would lead to state standing to challenge the IRS’s conferral of federal tax-exempt status
on an entity or class of entities, such as the private
schools in Allen, the hospitals in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization, or the Roman Catholic
Church in In re U.S. Catholic Conferences.
The opening of the standing back door would not
be limited to challenges to tax-exempt status. In
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Lew, 773 F.3d
815 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit held that
individual plaintiffs lacked standing to raise an Establishment Clause challenge to the “parsonage exemption,” which “excludes the value of employer-provided

13
housing benefits from the gross income of any ‘minister of the gospel’ ” for federal income tax purposes.
Id. at 818 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 107). Nearly every
State has opted to use federal gross income as the
base for calculation of state income taxes. See Ruth
Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the
Federal Tax Base, 62 Duke L.J. 1267, 1269 (2013).
Under respondents’ standing theory, any of those
States would have standing to challenge the parsonage exemption, any expansion of it, or any feature of
federal tax law that lowers federal gross income on
the ground that state income tax revenue has been
reduced.
States voluntarily incorporate federal law or
practices in myriad other ways.6 Many changes at
the federal level will therefore inevitably have fiscal
or other impacts on the States. When a State does

6

Texas law alone offers many examples. Texas provides free
tuition and other subsidies to disabled veterans, borrowing the
federal definition for who qualifies. Tex. Educ. Code § 54.341;
see Pet. Br. 32 (listing other examples). If the federal government were to change how it defines who is a disabled veteran,
the effect on Texas’s budget would likely be far greater than in
this case. See also Tex. Educ. Code §§ 5.001(4), 29.153(b)(2) (requiring school districts to offer free prekindergarten to children
who meet federal standard for free or reduced-price lunch);
id. § 54.241 (subsidized higher education for qualifying military
personnel and their families); see generally F. Scott Boyd,
Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 La.
L. Rev. 1201, 1262-73 (2008) (observing that “states have probably adopted federal law on almost every imaginable subject” and
providing examples).
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not like incorporated federal policy—whether because
of the corresponding impact on its fisc or otherwise—
its proper recourse is through the political system.
The State can seek relief either at the federal level,
where it can press for a change in federal policy, or
before its own legislature, where it can avoid the
fiscal impact by exercising its sovereign prerogative
to modify or abandon its reliance on federal law. It
cannot, however, properly use its voluntary incorporation of federal actions to create an end-run around
established rules of Article III jurisdiction.
The court of appeals was untroubled by such
possibilities because it thought it “pure speculation”
that respondents or other States “would sue about
matters such as * * * IRS revenue ruling[s].” Pet.
App. 35a. But just as this Court “would not uphold
an unconstitutional statute merely because the
Government promised to use it responsibly,” United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010), the Court
should not find Article III satisfied merely because
plaintiffs promise not to irresponsibly use a relaxation of standing requirements in future cases.
3. In each of the preceding examples, and many
others, the State could simply avoid the alleged
injury by changing its laws so that they no longer
incorporate another sovereign’s choices. The Fifth
Circuit thought that the need for such a change
would itself be a harm caused by federal policy—
according to that court, the Guidance placed “substantial pressure” on Texas to change its driver’slicense law, thus giving Texas standing. Pet. App. 16a.
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If such “pressure” conferred standing, it would lead
to the radical conclusion that a State would have
standing whenever it adopts federal classifications,
including in every one of the scenarios discussed
above. See supra pp. 12-13 & n.6. The same pressure
was present in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, yet the
Court still held that Pennsylvania’s “self-inflicted”
injury could not be the basis for standing. 426 U.S. at
663-64. In particular, the Court held that the answer
to Pennsylvania’s injury was not a federal lawsuit but
Pennsylvania’s “withdrawing [its] credit for taxes paid
to New Jersey.” Id. at 664. The “pressure” to take
that legislative step provided no basis for standing;
“[n]o sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests” of the
State were “implicated.” Id. at 666. Nor are they
here.
That there may be constitutional or other limits
on Texas’s options for changing its driver’s-license
program to avoid its self-imposed “harm” does not
change the analysis. See Pet. Br. 28. Those exogenous constraints do not arise from the Guidance and
are therefore not relevant to the question of respondents’ standing to challenge it. The Pennsylvania
legislature would have likewise faced constraints on
its ability to change its tax scheme in Pennsylvania v.
New Jersey. See Comptroller of the Treasury v.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805-06 (2015) (holding that
Maryland violated the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause by refusing to grant a tax credit for
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taxes paid to another State).7 Yet those external
constraints did not alter the Court’s conclusion that
Pennsylvania’s injury was “self-inflicted” and therefore provided no basis for standing.
It is pure speculation, moreover, that Texas is
constrained from adopting its preferred licensing
scheme because we do not even know what that
scheme might be. Texas asserts that it is forbidden
by federal law from creating its own immigration
classifications and that this somehow prevents it
from achieving its policy goals. Br. in Opp. 16. To the
contrary, nothing in the Guidance appears to prevent
Texas from achieving the objectives reflected in
its laws and regulations. Current Texas law bases
7

In Wynne, Maryland taxed both the income that residents
of other States earned from sources in Maryland and the income
that Maryland residents earned from out-of-state sources. 135
S. Ct. at 1792. Because Maryland did not provide a full Maryland income tax credit for taxes its residents paid to other
States, its scheme discriminated against interstate commerce by
effectively taxing more heavily income earned elsewhere. Id. at
1803-04. The Court explained that its conclusion was “all but
dictate[d]” by three cases that predate the decision in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey. See id. at 1794-95 (citing J.D. Adams Mfg.
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)). Thus, although Pennsylvania
would have been free to drop its tax credit for income earned in
New Jersey (and thus avoid its self-inflicted injury), the dormant Commerce Clause likely would have required it to simultaneously drop any tax on income earned by New Jersey
residents from Pennsylvania sources or forbear from adopting
one. See id. at 1806.
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driver’s-license eligibility solely on the fact of the
Secretary’s having issued “documentation” to an
alien—without any qualification, such as a requirement that the issuance have been authorized by
federal law. Tex. Transp. Code § 521.142(a); Verifying
Lawful Presence 1-5. Aliens eligible for deferred
action under the Guidance would have such “documentation” as a factual matter, and there is nothing
on the face of the Texas statute (or the regulations
interpreting it) indicating that providing them driver’s licenses would conflict with any state policy. And
there are plausible reasons why Texas may have
decided to rely on the fact of documentation: By
accepting the federal government’s documentation as
the trigger for a driver’s license, Texas avoids any
need to independently investigate the conditions
surrounding an alien’s immigration status.
If Texas has some other policy goal not apparent
from its laws, it has failed to disclose it, much less
explain how it might be thwarted. Texas policy, of
course, can only be determined from its existing
statutes and regulations, or any new legislation or
administrative rule; it cannot be articulated by its
attorneys in a brief. If Texas lawmakers desire a
different policy, Texas is free to stop subsidizing all
driver’s licenses, or to stop subsidizing those issued to
aliens with deferred action, or to take any number of
other actions. See Pet. Br. 26. Yet Texas has shown
no interest in taking those steps. Until Texas or
another State actually takes some action toward
adopting a different policy, federal courts are not a
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proper forum for debating the issue. See New Jersey
v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 338 (1926) (holding that
New Jersey lacked standing to challenge the Federal
Water Power Act where “[t]here is no showing that
the state is now engaged or about to engage in any
work or operations which the act purports to prohibit
or restrict, or that the defendants are interfering or
about to interfere with any work or operations in
which the state is engaged”).
In the hypothetical event Texas or another State
were to adopt a policy of providing (or subsidizing)
driver’s licenses for some, but not all, deferred action
recipients, an aggrieved alien with deferred action
could file suit to challenge that denial. Such a rejected license-seeker would of course have an injury and
standing. That would be a proper lawsuit for the
determination of any limitations on state authority to
carry out some other preferred policy. To the extent
that such a disappointed license applicant sought to
rely upon the federal Guidance as a basis for challenging the license rejection, a State could argue in
response that it was not required to give licenses to
those aliens covered by the Guidance and, in the alternative, that the Guidance was invalid. The issue would
thus be joined in a conventional case undergirded by
a real injury. At present, however, respondents’ claim
of injury is doubly speculative: we do not know
whether Texas does wish to adopt any different policy,
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and we do not know whether there is any reason it
cannot do so.8
B. Texas Has No Concrete, Particularized
Injury That Is Either Actual Or Imminent
Respondents lack standing for a second, independent reason: they fail to allege a concrete injury
and therefore do not satisfy Article III. Standing to
sue requires a “distinct and palpable” injury, Allen,
468 U.S. at 751, “to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination,” Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). A bare allegation
that some action will require increased state spending does not establish a concrete injury; pointing to
the costs of a state program “is just the beginning of
the analysis.” Winn, 563 U.S. at 137.

8

The circumstances of this case bear no resemblance to
those in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Restricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). Cf. Br. in Opp.
19. There, this Court held that the Arizona legislature had
standing to challenge an Arizona constitutional amendment on
redistricting, even though the legislature had yet to take any
specific redistricting action that might have been barred by the
challenged amendment. Id. at 2663-65. That was so because
“any” redistricting action the legislature took “would directly
and immediately conflict with the regime Arizona’s Constitution
establishes.” Id. at 2663-64 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, state lawmakers have numerous options for structuring
their driver’s-license programs, as the diversity of existing state
programs shows.
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1. This Court has repeatedly rejected standing
to sue when plaintiffs allege the type of injury respondents allege here—increased government spending. See Br. in Opp. 12-13, 17 (claiming standing on
the ground that the Guidance would “impose substantial costs on [respondents’] driver’s-license programs”
and would “cause [respondents] to incur healthcare,
law-enforcement, and education costs”). The Court
has explained that when a government expends
resources, “its budget does not necessarily suffer.”
Winn, 563 U.S. at 136; see Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344. “On
the contrary, the purpose of many governmental
expenditures and tax benefits is to ‘spur economic
activity, which in turn increases government revenues,’ ” or to provide other expected benefits. Winn,
563 U.S. at 136 (quoting Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344).
Because a State has already undertaken its own costbenefit analysis before approving an expenditure, it is
“conjectural or hypothetical” for taxpayers to assert
that such costs are an injury. See Cuno, 547 U.S. at
344 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Just as a taxpayer may not assert that a challenged policy creates an injury because it requires a
State to spend money, a State that has itself already
conducted the applicable cost-benefit analysis may
not either. In this case, the Texas legislature presumably acted rationally when it set the fee for
driver’s licenses at a level that required a subsidy;
that is, it saw offsetting benefits (e.g., safer roads,
more drivers with automobile insurance, increased
employment). Texas is not the only State to make
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that cost-benefit calculation. Indeed, some States,
including respondents Utah and Nevada, go further
than Texas and offer driver’s licenses to immigrants
regardless of their immigration status. See Utah
Code Ann. § 53-3-207; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 483.291(2)(b).9
Presumably, those States too saw offsetting benefits
from the costs of issuing additional licenses. Texas
has offered no reason, let alone evidence, why the
balance of costs and offsetting benefits will be any
different for people newly eligible for licenses because
of the Guidance than for all of the other deferredaction recipients whom Texas has long subsidized.
See Intervenors’ Br. 33. It has therefore failed to
demonstrate a concrete injury.
If respondents were correct that increased state
expenditures alone are an Article III injury, without
regard to any of the other effects of the challenged
action, then Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007), would have been an easy standing case. The
Environmental Protection Agency’s policy of not
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles almost certainly increased the costs of
States like California that filled the gap with their
9

See also Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., State Laws Providing
Access to Driver’s Licenses or Cards, Regardless of Immigration
Status 2-3 (July 2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/drivers-license-access-table-2015-07-01.pdf (listing other
States); Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes or No Answer: A Plea to End
the Oversimplification of the Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L.
& Pol. 435, 445-50 (2008) (discussing some of the policy rationales).
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own regulations. See Cal. Health & Safety Code
§ 43018.5(h) (California greenhouse-gas regulation
may not be required if “the federal government
adopts a standard regulating a greenhouse gas from
new motor vehicles” of equal or better effectiveness);
Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, & Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 281, 282
(2003). California thus could have alleged a pocketbook injury related to federal policy just as Texas does
here (and could have relied on its voluntary incorporation of federal law to satisfy the causation requirement).
Such incidental state expenditures, however,
have never been considered a cognizable injury for
standing purposes. The Fifth Circuit thought an incidental increase in state expenditures must be
sufficient because otherwise courts would be required
to engage in impermissible “costs and benefits” analysis. Pet. App. 23a. But that overlooks the critical
fact that Texas itself has already conducted that
analysis, and found that benefits offset costs. To
nonetheless find an injury by looking at only one side
of that ledger would be unwarranted. See Winn, 563
U.S. at 136-37.
The effects of recognizing a mere incidental
increase to a State’s budget as a cognizable injury
would be far-reaching. Indeed, Texas asserts not only
a burden on its budget from driver licensing, but also
from its claim that it will increase spending on
healthcare, education, and law enforcement as incidental consequences of the Guidance. Other States
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will be able to assert the same burdens on their
budgets as the result of virtually every federal policy.
The result will be federal courts transformed into
arenas for political battles between States and the
federal government—and among the States themselves because in most such cases, as here, some
States will conclude that the challenged federal policy
is beneficial.
2. Importantly, Texas’s alleged financial injury
is wholly unlike the state injury the Court accepted
as a basis for standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
case on which the Fifth Circuit relied to justify giving
respondents “special solicitude” to assert their claim,
Pet. App. 12a-20a. Most fundamentally, no part of
Massachusetts’ injury was self-imposed; unlike respondents here, Massachusetts could not have avoided the
harm it alleged by simply choosing not to extend a
subsidy or incorporate federal law or practice.
Further, unlike in Massachusetts, the States here
bring their claims under the generic cause of action in
the APA, not under the kind of special judicial review
provision the existence of which the Court in Massachusetts deemed “of critical importance to the standing inquiry.” 549 U.S. at 516. The Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) provides no such special “procedural right” of judicial review to respondents. To the
contrary, “the removal process is entrusted to the
discretion of the Federal Government,” not the States.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
The INA provides only narrowly circumscribed paths
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to judicial review—all for aliens, not States or other
third parties. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
Finally, Massachusetts’ injury went directly to its
sovereignty as a State—its “well-founded desire to
preserve its sovereign territory” from encroachment
by a rising sea, as well as its personal stake in preserving state-owned coastal lands. Massachusetts,
549 U.S. at 519, 522-23. That some respondents may
choose to subsidize immigrant driver’s licenses under
a program their legislatures voluntarily implemented
(or complain of other indirect and incidental effects of
immigration) is not remotely comparable to Massachusetts’ interest in the literal preservation of its
sovereign territory.
C. At The Least, Respondents Lack Standing To Challenge The Designation Of
“Lawful Presence” Because They Have
Not Alleged Any Injury Resulting From
The Legal Effects Of That Designation
Respondents purport to challenge the Guidance’s
statement that aliens with deferred action status are
“lawfully present” in the United States. Br. in Opp.
21-23. Apart from simply indicating that an alien
will not be removed for so long as the federal government continues to forbear from such removal, see Pet.
Br. 37, however, the designation of “lawful presence”
has only a very limited effect under federal law with
respect to the aliens in question here—namely, it
makes them eligible to apply for Social Security
retirement and disability benefits, Medicare benefits,
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and benefits under railroad-worker programs. See
Pet. Br. 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2)-(4); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1.3(a)(4)(vi)).
Respondents have not even attempted to rely
on deferred-action recipients’ potential eligibility for
such federal benefits as a basis for any injury they
purport to have suffered. See Pet. App. 7a. Properly
so. Federal administration of Social Security and like
programs has nothing to do with state drivers’ licensing or the other state expenditures respondents
discuss. Respondents have thus not tried to show any
injury based on aliens’ potential benefits from such
federal programs. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that respondents have standing to challenge
some other aspects of the Guidance, they plainly have
no standing to challenge the designation of “lawful
presence” and the potential ancillary extension of
Social Security or other benefits to those with deferred action.
II.

RESPONDENTS LACK A CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER THE APA

Even if respondents had Article III standing,
their challenge to the Guidance would fail because
they lack an APA cause of action for two independent
reasons. First, the choice to defer removal is “committed to agency discretion by law” and therefore
immune from judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
Second, respondents cannot show that the injury they
complain of—increased spending on driver’s-license
registrations—“falls within the ‘zone of interests’
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sought to be protected by” federal immigration laws.
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883
(1990).
A. The Guidance Is An Exercise Of Prosecutorial Discretion That Is Committed
To Agency Discretion By Law And
Therefore Unreviewable
1. The APA bars review of decisions that are
“committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2). This prohibition has deep roots in our
tradition of limited judicial review. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803)
(“Where the head of a department acts in a case, in
which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which
he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again
repeated, that any application to a court to control, in
any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without
hesitation.”).
Exercises of enforcement discretion are in the
heartland of that prohibition on APA review. Indeed,
the “Court has recognized on several occasions over
many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process,
is a decision generally committed to an agency’s
absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
831 (1985). An agency’s decision not to take enforcement action is therefore “presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2).” Id. at 832. To rebut
that presumption of unreviewability, a party must
show that Congress circumscribed agency discretion
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by providing “meaningful standards for defining the
limits of that discretion” such that a reviewing court
has “ ‘law to apply.’ ” Id. at 834-35; see Lincoln v.
Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (“Congress may always
circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by
putting restrictions in the operative statutes * * * .”).
Sound reasons underlie the general nonreviewability of the Executive’s enforcement discretion. Such decisions require an agency to perform “a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which
are peculiarly within its expertise”; to determine
“whether it is likely to succeed in fulfilling its statutory mandate”; to evaluate whether undertaking
specific action “best fits the agency’s overall policies”;
and to assess “whether the agency has enough resources” to undertake an action at all. Lincoln, 508
U.S. at 193 (quotation marks omitted; quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831). Such quintessentially discretionary decisions are not amenable to judicial review.
That is particularly true here. The “complicated
balancing” an agency must perform when making
enforcement decisions is especially delicate for immigration: “Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire
Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of
aliens in this country who seek the full protection of
its laws.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. Undoubtedly
for that reason, Congress has long conferred and
protected executive discretion in immigration. As
this Court explained with regard to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
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1996 (IIRIRA), Congress has passed numerous immigration-related statutes “aimed at protecting the
Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that
can fairly be said to be the theme” of IIRIRA. Reno v.
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
486 (1999) (“AADC”). In AADC this Court interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to “give some measure of
protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions.” Id. at
485. That is, even in cases where there is an agency
enforcement action to remove—an action that would
normally “provide[ ] a focus for judicial review,”
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832—Congress limited judicial
review of agency decisions not to grant deferred
action.
2. Faced with this settled rule of nonreviewability, respondents appear to disclaim any
challenge to the Secretary’s decision not to remove
the individuals covered by the Guidance. Br. in Opp.
20 (no challenge to Secretary’s choice “deprioritizing
removal for identified aliens”); see Pet. App. 44a
(“Part of DAPA involves the Secretary’s decision—at
least temporarily—not to enforce the immigration
laws as to a class of what he deems to be low-priority
illegal aliens. But importantly, the states have not
challenged the priority levels he has established, and
neither the preliminary injunction nor compliance
with the APA requires the Secretary to remove any
alien or to alter his enforcement priorities.” (footnote
omitted)).
Respondents’ decision to eschew an explicit
challenge to the decision to defer removal was a wise
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one. Deferred action involves non-binding and revocable decisions not to remove aliens for a limited
time. AADC, 525 U.S. at 484-85. These decisions,
like the unreviewable agency decision in Heckler,
require the Department of Homeland Security to
calculate how to allocate limited resources, further
overall policy goals, and fulfill its statutory mandate.
They also require discretionary consideration of
“immediate human concerns,” such as family relations and individual safety, as well as “international
relations.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499. Because
Congress gave no meaningful standards for limiting
that discretion, there is no law to apply and the APA
does not permit judicial review.
Instead of expressly challenging the Secretary’s
decision not to remove certain categories of aliens,
respondents purport to challenge only his “affirmative acts of granting lawful presence and workauthorization eligibility.” Br. in Opp. 21. But that
linguistic characterization does not make the agency
action that is the object of their challenge any more
reviewable.
First, as noted above, the so-called “affirmative
act of granting lawful presence” is not distinct from
the decision to forebear removal. See Pet. Br. 38.
And the only legal consequence of the designation of
“lawful presence” is to make aliens eligible to apply
for Social Security and other benefits—an ancillary
effect respondents have no standing to challenge. See
supra Section I.C.
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Second, the principal consequence flowing from
the government’s decision to forbear removal about
which respondents do complain—the eligibility to
apply for work authorization—is not “conferred” by
the Secretary’s Guidance. That incidental consequence is instead established by other statutes and
regulations that were on the books for decades before
the Guidance issued. E.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14)
(deferred-action recipients may apply for work authorization); see also Pet. App. 110a-12a (King, J.,
dissenting) (discussing other examples). An alien’s
eligibility to apply for work authorization (which, if
granted, will make it lawful for an employer to hire
that alien, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (h)(3)) can be
triggered by any number of discretionary enforcement
decisions by the Secretary that are themselves committed to the Secretary’s discretion and therefore
unreviewable, see Pet. Br. 40. Accordingly, if such
eligibility provided a basis for judicial review under
the APA, Heckler and 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) would
effectively become inapplicable in the immigration
context.10

10

In their brief in opposition, respondents suggest that they
are challenging the substantive correctness of the thirty-year-old
work authorization regulation, at least as applied to classes of
aliens specified by statute as eligible for work authorization. Br.
in Opp. 34-35. The time for bringing such a challenge has long
passed. Pet. Br. 54-55.
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Respondents’ attempt to characterize their challenge as one to incidental consequences, not enforcement discretion, is also incompatible with the INA’s
judicial review scheme. That statute prohibits an
alien denied deferred action from seeking review of
that decision. Pet. Br. 41; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Surely,
an alien denied deferred action could not file suit
under the APA and successfully claim he was seeking
review not of that adverse deferred action decision
but instead of his resulting ineligibility for work
authorization. If aliens—who have carefully circumscribed judicial review rights under the INA—could
not bring an APA claim regarding incidental consequences, surely a non-alien—with no INA judicial
review rights of any kind—may not do so. Cf. Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1984)
(presence of a “complex and delicate” statutory
scheme for administrative and judicial review at the
behest of only certain parties demonstrates congressional intent to “foreclose” APA suits by others).
3. Allowing review based on the label attached
to a non-enforcement decision, or on incidental
benefits or authorizations that can flow from it, would
mark a dramatic departure from settled understandings of the limits of the APA cause of action.
Many decisions not to enforce or prosecute can have
collateral consequences. For example, a government
contractor may be suspended from bidding for new
government contracts if it is indicted for certain
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offenses. 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.407-1(b)(1), -2(b).11 If the
Attorney General, in her discretion, decides to dismiss the indictment, then the disability is lifted. The
collateral benefit of the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is the ability to bid for a government
contract.
Under Heckler, the Attorney General’s decision to
drop the indictment would clearly be unreviewable.
Yet, by pursuing respondents’ theory of APA reviewability in this case, one of the company’s competitors
for a government contract could nonetheless use the
APA to challenge the Attorney General’s decision,
contending that it was not actually challenging the
non-prosecution but instead only the supposedly
11

Such provisions are commonplace. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(g)(1) (party indicted for certain offenses is barred from
affiliating with a federally insured depository institution, and
may not control an insured institution’s operations); 9 C.F.R.
§ 439.52 (indicted chemical laboratory’s accreditation may be
suspended); 13 C.F.R. § 108.1630(b)(2) (indicted broker may be
suspended from dealing in debentures or trust certificates “while
the charge is pending”); id. § 120.110(n) (business with associate
under indictment ineligible for Small Business Administration
business loan); id. § 120.660(b)(2) (indicted broker or dealer may
be suspended from selling or dealing in regulated certificates);
id. § 120.1711(b)(3) (similar for purchasing or dealing in pool
loans, loan interests, or pool certificates); 19 C.F.R. § 118.21(a)(2)
(operator of customs centralized examination station may be
barred from operating facility while under indictment); 24 C.F.R.
§ 202.5(j)(2) (lenders ineligible to participate in federal housing
programs while under indictment); id. § 214.103(c) (also barring
an indicted party from acting as a Housing and Urban Development-approved counseling agency).
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“affirmative act[ ]” (Br. in Opp. 21) of authorizing the
contractor to bid on a new contract.
B. Respondents Cannot Show An Injury
Within The Zone Of Interests Congress
Protected Under The INA
Respondents have no APA cause of action for the
additional reason that their alleged injuries are not
within the zone of interests protected under the INA.
To bring an APA claim a plaintiff must establish that
its alleged injury “falls within the ‘zone of interests’
sought to be protected by the statutory provision
whose violation forms the legal basis” for its complaint. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 883. “In
cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the
contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of
review if the plaintiff ’s interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit
in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed
that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
Respondents’ alleged injuries are too “marginally
related” (ibid.) to any INA-protected interests to pass
the test. Indeed, they are wholly unrelated. Respondents claim they will suffer increased costs of administering state programs, such as subsidized driver’s
licenses, for immigrants granted deferred action
under the Secretary’s Guidance. Yet nothing in the
INA protects those interests: “[T]he central concern of
the INA is with the terms and conditions of admission
to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens
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lawfully in the country.” Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Respondents
acknowledge as much by pointing to Texas law, not
the INA, when attempting to show that Texas “has a
significant interest” in the challenged Guidance. Br.
in Opp. 27 & n.14.
This Court’s discussion of the zone-of-interests
test in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,
562 U.S. 170 (2011), illuminates respondents’ failure
to satisfy it. In Thompson, the Court held that the
zone-of-interests test (which it borrowed from APA
law) should limit the class of plaintiffs who may bring
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 562 U.S. 17778. The Court explained that application of this test
was necessary to prevent “absurd consequences” that
would follow from allowing anyone with Article III
standing to sue. Id. at 176-77. For example, without
the zone-of-interests test, “a shareholder would be
able to sue a company for firing a valuable employee
for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he
could show that the value of his stock decreased as a
consequence.” Id. at 177. If anything, respondents’
claimed interests, such as holding down their spending on driver’s licenses, are even further afield from
the INA than were those of the hypothetical shareholder from Title VII. The APA therefore provides
them no cause of action.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
court of appeals should be reversed.
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